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Introduction 
On November 22, 2014, Officer Timothy Loehmann tragically shot 
and killed Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old boy, in Cleveland, Ohio.1 The 
 
1. See Christine Mai-Duc, Cleveland Officer Who Killed Tamir Rice Had Been 
Deemed Unfit for Duty, L.A. Times (Dec. 3, 2014, 5:38 PM), http:// 
www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-cleveland-tamir-rice-timothy-
loehmann-20141203-story.html [https://perma.cc/T5NU-KLU3] (providing 
a brief description of the events surrounding Tamir Rice’s death and the 
employment history of Officer Loehmann); see also Roger A. Clark, 
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Cuyahoga County prosecutor declined to recommend charges against 
Loehmann for the shooting.2 What was lost in the story surrounding 
this tragic death was not the fact that Officer Loehmann should have 
faced charges, but that he should not have been employed as a 
Cleveland police officer in the first place. When looking at his previous 
stint as a police officer, it becomes clear that he was not only unfit to 
serve and protect the community of Cleveland, but that he should have 
been prohibited from serving as a police officer anywhere. 
In 2012, Loehmann served in the Independence Police Department, 
only thirteen miles south of Cleveland, for five months.3 During the first 
four months, he trained in the Cleveland Heights Police Academy.4 
Personnel records from his time in Independence show that by Decem-
ber of 2012, the Independence Police Department began internal pro-
ceedings to fire Loehmann.5 According to the records, he had exhibited 
a pattern of emotional instability, immaturity, and an inability to fol-
low basic instructions during firearms training at the Academy.6 Before 
the Independence Police Department fired him, however, Loehmann 
resigned citing personal reasons.7 
 
Expert Reporting on the Shooting Death of Tamir Rice (2015), 
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2623274-roger-clark-expert-
report.html [https://perma.cc/K4VP-CFNY] (discussing, at length, Clark’s 
reasoning behind his finding that “[Loehmann’s] shooting of Tamir Rice was 
inconsistent with generally accepted standards and norms in police practices 
and that it was an unreasonable and unjustified use of deadly force.”). 
2. Timothy Williams and Mitch Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face 
Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. Times (Dec. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleve 
land.html [https://perma.cc/U9D5-D88W]. 
3. Mai-Duc, supra note 1. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. Officer Loehmann’s personnel files show that Loehmann displayed 
disregard for department regulations, insubordination, and a lack of 
commitment. City of Independence, Ohio Personnel File of Timothy 
Loehmann, at 56–59, available online at https://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
252024886/Independence-PD-Timothy-Loehmann-Records#fullscreen& 
from_embed [https://perma.cc/H84B-LXRR] [hereinafter Loehmann 
Personnel File]. 
6. Mai-Duc, supra note 1; see Loehmann Personnel File, supra note 5, at 55 
(“[D]uring a state [shooting] range qualification course, Ptl. Loehmann was 
distracted and weepy . . . could not follow simple directions . . . and his 
handgun performance was dismal.”). 
7. Mai-Duc, supra note 1; see Loehmann Personel File, supra note 5, at 58–59 
(“I advised him of my intent and reasons [for firing him], and Ptl. Loehmann 
decided to resign instead for personal reasons. I accepted his written 
resignation.”). 
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When the Cleveland Police Department hired Loehmann, it did so 
without examining his personnel records from Independence as part of 
its background check.8 When the hiring officers called the Independence 
human resources department, the director did not disclose the issues 
that led to Loehmann’s resignation.9 A cursory glance through 
Loehmann’s personnel records, however, would have shown the hiring 
officers that he had displayed a disturbing lack of maturity.10 In fact, 
Loehmann’s direct supervisor and Independence Deputy Chief of Police 
James Polak said, “I do not believe time, nor training, will be able to 
change or correct these deficiencies.”11 After resigning from Inde-
pendence, Loehmann attempted to secure employment at four other 
police departments.12 Each police department rejected Loehmann before 
Cleveland hired him.13 How, then, did these four police departments 
know not to hire him when Cleveland did not? 
Tragically, this is an oft-repeated problem across the United States. 
In 2004, Sean Sullivan, a police officer in Oregon, was barred from a 
future career as a police officer as part of his sentence for kissing a ten-
year-old girl on the mouth.14 Three months later, Cedar Vale, Kansas 
hired him as their police chief. He was later investigated for an alleged 
sexual relationship with an underage girl.15 Sullivan was eventually 
convicted of burglary and criminal conspiracy.16 Officer Eddie Boyd III 
resigned from the St. Louis Police Department after two incidents: he 
struck a twelve-year-old girl with his gun in 2006; and, after doing the 
 
8. Mai-Duc, supra note 1. 
9. Id. 
10. Loehmann Personnel File, supra note 5, at 59.  
11. Id. at 58. Loehmann listed James Polak as his direct supervisor. Cuyahoga 
County Application for Employment, Timothy Loehmann, at 3, available 
online at http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1391683-application-
resume-01062015163324-redacted.html#document/ [https://perma.cc/E9Q 
U-F2SR]. 
12. James Downie, Tamir Rice Case Is a Perversely Fitting End to a Year of 
Police Controversies, Wash. Post (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-a-12-year-old-boy-is-killed-by-police-and-
no-one-is-accountable/2015/12/31/6970e528-afbd-11e5-b820-eea4d64be2a1_ 
story.html?utm_term=.7995e4d54ed6 [https://perma.cc/5C7R-9HL4]. 
13. Id. 
14. Timothy Williams, Cast-Out Police Officers Are Often Hired in Other 
Cities, N.Y. Times (Sept. 10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
09/11/us/whereabouts-of-cast-out-police-officers-other-cities-often-hire-them. 
html [https://perma.cc/45ME-U88B]. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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same to a young boy in 2007, he falsified the subsequent police report.17 
Officer Boyd, now with the Ferguson Police Department, is the subject 
of a lawsuit stemming from an incident in which he allegedly arrested 
a woman who asked for his name after a traffic accident.18 
In the 1990s—at the height of the unrest following the Rodney King 
beating—the mayors of Los Angeles and New York City created 
commissions to investigate police department corruption and mis-
conduct.19 The Christopher Commission of Los Angeles and the Mollen 
Commission of New York City discovered widespread issues of corrup-
tion, racial profiling, excessive use of force, and other forms of police 
misconduct.20 They also discovered an appalling lack of intrade-
partmental accountability.21 In the nearly two decades since these com-
missions, much has been said about what must be done to prevent “bad 
apple” police officers from leaving one jurisdiction to serve in another. 
Unfortunately, little progress has been made in implementing effective 
responses to this most pressing of issues. 
The middle part of the 1990s was marked by heightened public 
scrutiny of police-community relations, brought on by the Rodney King 
beating and the Christopher and Mollen Commissions. As a result, dur-
ing the 104th Congress, Representative Harry Johnston and Senator 
Bob Graham, both of Florida, introduced bills that would have rend-
ered this discussion moot. The Law Enforcement and Correctional 
Officers Employment Registration Act of 1996 would have amended the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to create a 
 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, 
Report (1991) [hereinafter Christopher Commission Report]; The 
City of New York Commission to Investigate Allegations of 
Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the 
Police Department, Anatomy of Failure: A Path for Success 
(Commission Report) (1994) [hereinafter Mollen Commission Report]. 
20. See Christopher Commission Report, supra note 19, at vii–xxiii 
(providing a detailed summary of findings, including those on excessive use 
of force, racism and bias, and structural issues); Mollen Commission 
Report, supra note 19, at 1–10 (providing a detailed summary of findings 
on police corruption issues within the NYPD). 
21. For a discussion on the lack of accountability of individual officers who often 
face no repercussions for their actions, and of commanding officers who, 
through the structure of the LAPD and of Los Angeles city government, 
receive little oversight, see Chapters 9 and 10 of the Christopher 
Commission Report, supra note 19, at 151–221. For a closer look at how 
corruption permeated the NYPD’s internal investigation division, see 
Chapter 4 of the Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at 70–89. 
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national clearinghouse for law enforcement employment data.22 The 
findings section of both versions of the act explained why a clearing-
house was needed: “[T]here have been numerous documented cases of 
officers who have obtained officer employment and certification in a 
State after revocation of officer certification or dishonorable discharge 
in another State.”23 
The clearinghouse, overseen by the Department of Justice, would 
have listed all previous employment in law enforcement agencies, for all 
law enforcement officers.24 Under the Act, every applicant for a law en-
forcement position, including those positions within police depart-
ments—both elected and appointed—and state correctional facilities, 
would have been required to fill out an authorization for release of rec-
ords during the application process.25 The records would include the ap-
plicant’s name, date of birth, Social Security number, and other vital 
information, as well as whether the person’s state law enforcement certi-
fication had been revoked.26 The Act also allowed for immunity from 
civil liability for disclosure by officers or departments that, in good 
faith, complied with the provisions of the bill.27 
Both bills never made it past committee.28 During a hearing on the 
House version of the bill, then Representative Charles Schumer outlined 
many of the criticism that these bills faced. Along with many others, 
he thought that the database would be an invasion of officers’ privacy, 
and that it was an unnecessary solution to a non-existent problem.29 He 
also criticized the broad overreach that the bill presented: “When we’re 
concerned only about so-called rogue officers, why not just list the few 
bad officers?”30 Another criticism, from the National Troopers Coali-
 
22. S. 484, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 3263, 104th Cong. (1996). 
23. S. 484 § 2; H.R. 3263 § 2. 
24. S. 484 § 3; H.R. 3263 § 3. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. H.R. 3263 (104th): Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment 
Registration Act of 1996, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/104/hr3263 [https://perma.cc/E4KS-TG3U] (last visited Mar. 14, 
2017); S. 484 (104th): Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers 
Employment Registration Act of 1995, GovTrack, https://www. 
govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/s484 [https://perma.cc/DQQ6-7KP6] (last 
visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
29. Police Officers’ Rights and Benefits: Hearing on H.R. 218, H.R. 878, H.R. 
1805, H.R. 2912 and H.R. 3263 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 37 (1996) (statement of Rep. Schumer). 
30. Id. 
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tion, was the uncertainty regarding the confidentiality of the informa-
tion provided to the database.31 Further issues were raised about the 
procedural due process rights of police officers.32 This mainly took the 
form of concerns regarding whether an officer would have notice of what 
information would be reported and whether an officer would have the 
right to appeal the information that appears on his or her disciplinary 
record.33 
Not all police organizations opposed the bill, though. In fact, the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) was the first to 
urge Representative Johnston to introduce the bill.34 Though the IACP 
had reservations, particularly in ensuring that each state would provide 
due process to officers if their licenses were revoked, it supported the 
bill because of its benefit to smaller jurisdictions.35 Sheriffs from police 
departments across the county also wrote or testified in favor of the 
bill. Their reason for supporting the bill mirrored that of the IACP: the 
relative lack of funding that smaller police departments have to carry 
out background checks.36 Further, James T. Moore, the Commissioner 
of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, specifically discussed 
the weakness of background checks in discovering officer misconduct 
committed in the employ of out-of-state police departments.37 
Unfortunately, this support was insufficient. 
Once again, the highly volatile nature of police-community relations 
has placed this issue in the public spotlight. Two potential solutions 
have been proffered that would ameliorate this issue. The database leg-
islation discussed above is one such solution.38 The other posits to 
 
31. Id. at 87–88 (statement of James A. Rhinebarger, Chairman, National 
Troopers Coalition). 
32. Id. at 110–11 (responses of Gilbert G. Gallegos, National President of the 
Fraternal Order of Police, to questions from Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee of 
Texas). 
33. Id. at 112 (statement of William J. Johnson, General Counsel, National 
Association of Police Organizations, Inc.). 
34. Id. at 145 (statement of Roy C. Kime, Legislative Counsel, International 
Association of Chiefs of Police). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 118 (statement of Patrick Sullivan, Jr., Sheriff of Arapahoe County, 
Colorado). 
37. Id. at 174 (prepared statement of James T. Moore, Comm’r of the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement). 
38. In 2009, the Department of Justice gave a $200,000 grant to the International 
Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training 
(“IADLEST”) to create a database for the purposes of tracking decertified 
officers. The Department of Justice no longer funds the initiative, and the 
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persuade states to enact a model decertification law. Much has been 
written on what that legislation would look like.39 This Note proposes 
a different solution—one which is a combination of previous ideas, but 
which would take further steps to strengthen accountability. Rather 
than allowing the states to enact minimum standards for officers, Con-
gress should enact legislation that requires the Department of Justice 
to promulgate minimum standards for police officers. The Department 
of Justice should have the power to persuade, but not coerce, states to 
enact these minimum standards. The federal government, through the 
Department of Justice, should also create a database, similar to the one 
discussed above, that would store the employment data, reported by 
the states, of officers who have had their certification revoked or sus-
pended. This type of legislation would be constructed similarly to the 
Clean Air Act: state agencies would be responsible for enacting and 
enforcing these standards on state and local police departments. The 
Department of Justice would only be involved when a state or local 
police department declines to enact or properly enforce the standards. 
This Note will delve into how this type of system will overcome any 
barriers to implementation and how the ideal system would operate. 
 
director of the IADLEST complained that a lack of resources prevented 
IADLEST from keeping up with problem officers. Williams, supra note 14. 
39. In the last three decades, Roger Goldman, of the St. Louis University School 
of Law, and Steven Puro, of the St. Louis University Department of Political 
Science, have written extensively on the use of decertification as a means of 
solving the police misconduct issue. See Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, 
Revocation of Police Officer Certification: A Viable Remedy for Police 
Misconduct?, 45 St. Louis U. L.J. 541, 575, 577–78 (2001) [hereinafter 
Revocation] (discussing the Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers 
Employment Registration Act, and the alternative possibility of persuading 
states to adopt programs that would ensure state agencies share data to 
prevent law enforcement officers from crossing state lines for new 
employment); see also Roger L. Goldman, A Model Decertification Law, 32 
St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 147 (2012) [hereinafter Model Law] (providing 
an example of a model decertification law); Roger  L. Goldman & Steven 
Puro, Decertification of Police: An Alternative to Traditional Remedies for 
Police Misconduct, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q. 45, 52–64 (1987) [hereinafter 
Alternative Remedies] (examining the shortcomings of remedies such as the 
exclusionary rule, criminal prosecutions against law enforcement officers, and 
administrative complaints); Roger L. Goldman, State Revocation of Law 
Enforcement Officers’ Licenses and Federal Criminal Prosecution: An 
Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 22 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 121 
(2003) [hereinafter Cooperative Federalism] (urging federal prosecutors to 
explore state decertification, rather than litigation, as a means of punishing 
officers who have committed crimes); Steven Puro, Roger L. Goldman & 
William C. Smith, Police Decertification: Changing Patterns Among the 
States, 1985–1995, 20 Policing: An Int’l J. Police Strategies & 
Mgmt. 481 (1997) (depicting a research study on the evolution of police 
decertification in states). 
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Part I will explore the various types of misconduct that must be in-
cluded in this system, including criminal convictions, firings due to mis-
conduct, and resignations in the face of imminent discipline or investi-
gation. It also will consider certain infractions by officers that should 
be included, but that have serious hurdles to effective tracking which 
militate against inclusion in the system. Part II will discuss the current 
lack of accountability in law enforcement hiring decisions. This discus-
sion will include attention to the current challenges—legal, political, 
and cultural—that may, and often do, impede the implementation of 
this system. Part III will review what provisions would be appropriate 
for the legislation. It will examine what types of law enforcement offi-
cers should be included; the minimum standards of conduct that, if 
breached, would require law enforcement agencies to report the breach; 
the protections afforded law enforcement officers; and the incentives for 
state and local compliance. 
I. Police Misconduct Defined 
Police misconduct and the attempts to remedy it have existed for 
decades. Identifying and preventing police misconduct through police 
department reform was one of the goals of the President’s Commission 
on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, formed by 
President Johnson in 1965.40 While police misconduct has been a part 
of the public discourse in the past, it became and has remained, a larger 
part of the conversation in the aftermath of the Rodney King beating 
in Los Angeles. The Christopher Commission, created amid the result-
ing public outcry, raised a series of questions relating to police miscon-
duct.41 The Commission paid particular attention to the culture within 
the Los Angeles Police Department, the failure to penalize officers with 
repeated instances of misconduct, and the failure to flag potentially vio-
lent applicants during the hiring process.42 Questions also were raised 
about the efficacy of background investigations conducted by an over-
burdened hiring department.43 The Commission noted that, while some 
applicants were rejected due to previous instances of misconduct, back-
ground checks that indicated an applicant’s history of violence were 
overlooked.44 
 
40. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society vi (1967) 
available online at, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/23MS-W2TN].  
41. Christopher Commission Report, supra note 19, at 17. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at xvi. 
44. Id. at xv–xvi. 
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Police misconduct, though, is often hard to define. It certainly en-
compasses criminal activity and corruption, but what of the police ac-
tivity that may be wrong, but does not necessarily rise to a level that 
results in termination? While the optimal system would track all in-
stances of police misconduct, regardless of level, the systems that this 
Note aims to create would, at the very least, track criminal convictions, 
firings due to misconduct, and resignations in the face of imminent 
discipline. Police misconduct, then, should be defined as criminal active-
ty, corruption, and abuse of power. And though impractical to enforce 
or track, the ideal system would pay special attention to an officer’s 
demonstrated instances of racial profiling, implicit bias, and selective 
enforcement of laws due to the color of one’s skin, religion, sexual and 
gender identity, and mental capacity and illness. 
A. Criminal Activity 
Police officers, themselves tasked with investigating and preventing 
criminal activity, perpetrate crimes at a higher rate than one would 
think given their status as community protectors. Criminal activity of 
police officers encompasses a wide range of crimes motivated by varying 
factors. As the people tasked with protecting and serving communities, 
police officers must be law-abiding citizens and should be held to the 
same standards as other professionals, such as teachers and doctors, 
where certain convictions can preclude one from employment. 
Currently, there exists no nationwide reporting service for crimes com-
mitted by law enforcement officers and this presents a serious issue. 
For the purposes of this Note, criminal activity is defined as actions 
that can lead to a criminal conviction. Sex-related, drug-and-alcohol-
related, violence-related, and profit-related crimes are included in this 
category, as are forms of criminal corruption and perjury.45 A recent 
study, funded and published by the Department of Justice and carried 
out by researchers at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, found 
alarming trends in the limited data that the researchers used.46 By using 
an algorithm through the Google News search engine, the researchers 
were able to uncover 6,724 instances where police officers were arrested 
for various criminal activities between 2005 and 2011.47 The researchers 
recognized that this data set is limited due to the lack of available 
reporting resources, and thus does not include all police officers who 
may have engaged in criminal activity nationwide.48 
 
45. Philip Matthew Stinson, Sr. et al., Police Integrity Lost: A Study 
of Law Enforcement Officers Arrested 15 (2016). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 20–21. 
48. Id. at 19–21. 
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Sex-related crimes often involve an officer abusing his or her au-
thority, and typically involve violent sexual misconduct perpetrated 
against young victims.49 Sex-related crimes were the third-largest cate-
gory, with 1,475 cases involving just 1,070 law enforcement officers.50 
This clearly depicts a grave issue of repeat offenders, such as Sean 
Sullivan, who had at least two instances of inappropriate sexual contact 
with a minor.51 In fact, minor victims, like Officer Sullivan’s two vic-
tims, comprised almost half of the 1,475 cases in the study.52 Nearly 
one-third of cases involved some form of rape, either statutory or 
forcible.53 Preventing applicants with a history of sex-related crimes is 
of the utmost importance for protecting the most vulnerable members 
of the population. 
Alcohol-related crimes, particularly driving under the influence, are 
very common in police departments across the country.54 Many of the 
DUI arrests, however, were only carried out in extreme instances: traffic 
accidents, injuries, and fatalities.55 The researchers categorized these ar-
rests as officers who had “lost their exemption from law enforcement.”56 
When officers are stopped for simple DUI offenses, which do not involve 
injury, fatality, or property damage, they often are not arrested because 
of their status as a fellow law enforcement official.57 According to the 
study, even if the officer was arrested for an alcohol-related offense, lit-
tle more than one-third lost their jobs.58 This speaks to the need for re-
porting of all instances of misconduct, regardless of whether the officer 
was disciplined. 
Drug-related crimes are often entwined with profit-motivated 
crimes due to the nature of the drug trade.59 More than half of drug-re-
lated arrests could be categorized as profit-motivated as well.60 Thus, 
 
49. Id. at 23. 
50. Id. at 22. 
51. Williams, supra note 14. 
52. Stinson, et al., supra note 45, at 23. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 24.  
56. Id. at 23.  
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 24. Only 270 of the 1,405 incidents resulted in the department firing 
the officer. Of the remainder, 263 cases involved an officer voluntarily 
resigning, 612 involved officer suspensions, and in 260 incidents the officer 
did not face punishment. Id. at 124. 
59. Id. at 24. 
60. Id. 
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drug-related crimes related to personal use were not as prevalent as 
those related to trafficking, enabling the drug trade, and shakedowns 
of drug dealers.61 These crimes do have a slight overlap with corruption, 
most notably self-dealing and extortion. There is far less data on drug-
related crimes and hiring, however. Mandatory reporting of all drug-
related activity would open up police departments and give more infor-
mation for background check purposes. 
Violence-related crimes were far and away the most prevalent of-
fenses found in the study.62 Violence-related crimes seem to go hand in 
hand with being a police officer, as the sheer number of excessive-use-
of-force cases reported in the media show. But a significant amount of 
violence-related crimes are unrelated to use of force during an arrest. 
Nearly one-third of violence-related crime arrests during this period 
were for domestic violence.63 And, as the report indicates, many of these 
domestic violence arrests and convictions did not result in firings.64 The 
Gun Control Act of 196865 provides that persons convicted of domestic-
violence crimes face the prospect of losing the right to own a firearm.66 
Thus, the fact that officers can avoid criminal penalties for domestic-
violence crimes gives rise to questions regarding those officers’ contin-
ued use of weapons.67 
Profit-motivated crime arrests, though presenting an overlap with 
various forms of corruption such as extortion, were the second-highest 
category in the study.68 Excepting those forms of profit-motivated 
crimes that do overlap with corruption, serious questions are still raised 
by the varying crimes of theft from persons, robbery, or theft from 
buildings or businesses.69 But profit-motivated crimes do not always 
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 22. 
63. Id. at 24. 
64. Only 210 of 961 incidents resulted in an officer losing his job as a result of a 
domestic violence arrest or conviction. Of the remainder, 150 voluntarily 
resigned, 453 were suspended, and 148 did not face any known adverse 
employment decisions. Id. at 152. 
65. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012).  
66. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (making it unlawful for persons convicted of domestic 
violence crimes to own a firearm). 
67. Stinson et al., supra note 45, at 25. Originally, the Gun Control Act of 
1968 contained an exception for law enforcement officers to use firearms 
while on the job. With the passage of the “Lautenberg Amendment,” 
however, the exception was removed. Revocation, supra note 39, at 555–56. 
68. Stinson et al., supra note 45, at 22. 
69. Id. at 25. 
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result in job loss, just as the other forms of crimes do not.70 The largest 
chance for job loss relating to profit-motivated crimes occurs when the 
crime is also drug-related.71 Just as above, profit-motivated crimes 
should be included in this system. 
Police officers who commit crimes are acting conversely to the fun-
damental duties of law enforcement officials: the duties to protect and 
serve the community. Rather than upholding these duties, officers are 
taking advantage of their position and acting as if they are above the 
law. Therefore, the system this Note proposes needs to work with police 
departments to ensure that even officers who are privately sanctioned, 
as opposed to publicly disciplined through suspension or termination, 
are still reported to the database so that future police departments are 
made fully aware of an officer’s disciplinary issues. 
B. Corruption 
Corruption, though still a crime, can be much less visible to the 
public than those crimes listed above. As such, corruption investiga-
tions are often kept within the department and are tracked at a much 
lower rate. Corruption is a dereliction of duty itself, as officers are sworn 
to uphold the law. But a culture of corruption also spawns misconduct 
in other forms; if a police officer is likely to lie on the stand or file a 
false police report, then what else is the officer likely to do? Corruption, 
for the purposes of this Note, is defined as perjury, falsification of docu-
ments, cover-ups, and extortion. Corruption in police departments is 
much harder to define and weed out than other criminal activity, and 
this system must require police departments to self-report. 
Lying while under oath, or perjury, is common enough in police de-
partments that a new word was coined for the practice: “testilying.”72 
Testilying has been uncovered in large cities all across the country, and 
its rampant occurrence has fractured public trust in the police.73 A po-
lice officer’s lie can have serious, lasting consequences.74 It can lead to 
innocent persons being convicted of crimes they did not commit, and 
 
70. Profit-motivated cases, however, do result in job loss more frequently than 
other crimes; of 1,592 cases, 577 resulted in involuntary termination, 503 
resulted in voluntary resignation, 376 resulted in suspension, and 133 
resulted in no adverse action. Id. at 167. 
71. Id. at 25. 
72. Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at 36. 
73. Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The “Blue Wall of Silence” as Evidence 
of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Pitt. 
L. Rev. 233, 234–37 (1998). 
74. Id. at 237. 
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guilty persons freely walking away.75 Police perjury can be motivated 
by malice, but it can also be motivated by a desire to admit evidence 
obtained in violation of a suspect’s constitutional rights.76 The “Blue 
Wall of Silence,” the protective and secretive police code that prohibits 
disclosing a fellow officer’s perjury, presents many challenges, and is 
another reason police officers will lie or refuse to testify.77 Despite the 
difficulty in determining whether an officer has “testilied”—in part due 
to the “Blue Wall of Silence”—society must ensure that these officers 
are not able to obtain new employment in a law enforcement capacity. 
Falsification of documents related to an investigation is another se-
rious problem within police departments. The Mollen Commission un-
covered widespread falsification of police reports, often to protect the 
arresting officer, to cover up unlawful searches and seizures, or to frame 
an innocent civilian.78 Like testilying, the falsification of documents re-
lated to an investigation hurts police-community relations. And, like 
testilying, the “Blue Wall of Silence” often makes the issue worse by 
covering up falsification.79 This is especially so because investigators 
and prosecutors are unlikely to follow up on reports made by the com-
munity and, at times, ignore differing reports from the public, charac-
terizing the witness as “involved.”80 While it is difficult to say what evi-
dence would be necessary to decertify an officer for falsification of docu-
ments, it is clear that the issue must be addressed. 
Cover-ups are closely tied to perjury and falsification of documents, 
as they are the main ways in which cover-ups occur. One solution to 
the “Blue Wall of Silence” could be the addition of a category in the 
system that tracks officers who do not break with the “Blue Wall of Si-
lence” to report misconduct. While this might be a lower-level “offense” 
for the purposes of these systems, this could be a direct response to the 
culture of police departments and unions. It could present serious chal-
lenges as well. As it stands, police officers who do break the “Blue Wall 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at 36–43 (discussing these 
forms of corruption within the NYPD). 
79. Chin & Wells, supra note 73, at 237–41. 
80. See Christopher Commission Report, supra note 19, at 162–64, for a 
discussion of the LAPD’s classification system for witnesses to police 
misconduct. Often, internal investigators would cheat the system by labeling 
non-involved witnesses as “interested” solely because the witness made a 
complaint against the officer. Id. at 163. 
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of Silence” code often experience threats of violence, expulsion, and 
potential job loss.81 
Extortion is another common form of police corruption.82 While it 
generally affects citizens engaged in criminal activity, such as drug 
dealing, illegal gambling, or prostitution,83 it is just as important to 
track as the other forms of corruption. Extortion shows a propensity 
for criminal activity, and often targets more vulnerable segments of the 
population: people who might only be involved in these criminal ac-
tivities as a last resort or because they are forced into the activities.84 
Police officers who engage in extortion present dangers to the public. 
Rather than protecting vulnerable citizens, officers often take money, 
sex, or drugs in exchange for not arresting citizens engaged in criminal 
activity. This has many serious consequences; it allows criminal activity 
to perpetuate, endangers the most vulnerable members of society, and 
leads to more danger for law-abiding citizens. 
Corruption, though more private than the criminal activity dis-
cussed above, is no less important to track. Corruption breeds an envi-
ronment that is relaxed on crime and enforcement, while being protec-
tive of those officers who do engage in misconduct. It takes the form of 
officers who do not arrest other officers for DUI and of officers who are 
willing to protect other officers at the expense of the citizens they are 
sworn to protect and serve. While the system will have to rely on a 
modicum of self-reporting, the release of documents related to internal 
investigations will be a powerful tool for either system. 
C. Unconstitutional Activities 
Over the past two decades, the Department of Justice has entered 
into consent decrees with police departments all across the country. 
Beginning with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, the Department of Justice was authorized to investigate any 
non-federal law enforcement agencies for suspected civil rights viola-
tions under 34 U.S.C. 12601.85 Since then, consent decrees have been 
 
81. Chin & Wells, supra note 73, at 241–44. In one instance, New York City 
gave an armed detail to two officers who had testified against other officers 
because the city feared violent retaliation by police officers. Id. at 243–44. 
82. See Mollen Commission Report, supra note 19, at ex. 6, 4–8 (finding that 
the corruption had evolved from simply accepting briberies to actively 
extorting criminals). 
83. Id. 
84. See id. at ex. 6, 4–5.  
85. Conduct of Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/conduct-law-enforcement-agencies [https:// 
perma.cc/FC9L-E9PU] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017); 34 U.S.C. 12601 (2017) 
(formerly 42 U.S.C. 14141). 
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entered into with police departments in Pittsburgh, Washington D.C., 
Los Angeles, New Jersey, Oakland, Detroit, New Orleans, Seattle, 
Ferguson, and Cleveland, with further oversight taking place in 
Cincinnati, New York, and Baltimore.86 These investigations have 
turned up widespread constitutional violations within each police de-
partment. Violations include unconstitutional stop and frisks, searches 
and seizures, and excessive use of force.87 
The investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department is the 
most recent investigation that the Department of Justice has released 
to the public. The Department found that the Baltimore police officers 
were stopping law-abiding citizens at an alarming rate, often when the 
citizens were not participating in any criminal activity.88 Officers fre-
quently were using false pretenses, and not acting on any reasonable 
suspicion, to stop citizens in order to find evidence of criminal activity.89 
Similarly, the stop-and-frisk policy in New York City, which was similar 
to policies employed in other jurisdictions,90 was ruled unconstitutional 
in part because of the unreasonable, racially motivated nature of the 
stops in the first place.91 Police officers who are caught engaging in, or 
upper-level command officers who are caught enacting policies that re-
sult in, a pattern of unreasonable stop and frisks,92 therefore, should be 
included in this system. 
 
86. Police Reform and Accountability Accomplishments, U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925861/download [https://perma.cc/DK 
9X-QAXY] (last visited Mar. 17, 2017); Police Exec. Res. F., Civil 
Rights Investigations of Local Police: Lessons Learned 1–5 (2013), 
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/civil%20ri
ghts%20investigations%20of%20local%20police%20-%20lessons%20learned% 
202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/662A-V5QH].  
87. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the Baltimore City 
Police Department 3 (2016) [hereinafter Baltimore Report]. 
88. See id. at 24–34 (detailing the Baltimore police department’s unconstitutional 
practices). 
89. Id. 
90. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 559–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
Judge Scheindlin found that officers conducted a substantial amount of stops 
on citizens of color, even in areas of the cities that were not heavily populated 
by people of color. This is very similar to what the Department of Justice 
found in Baltimore, Chicago, and Ferguson. See, e.g., Baltimore Report, 
supra note 87, at 48–54; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the 
Chicago Police Department 19, 143–45 (2016) [hereinafter Chicago 
Report]; U.S. Dep’t of Just., Investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department 64–67 (2015) [hereinafter Ferguson Report]. 
91. Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 665–66. 
92. While there exists little publicly available data on individual officers’ use of 
unconstitutional and unreasonable stop-and-frisks, there exists some data on 
broad trends. See Becca James, Stop and Frisk in 4 Cities: The Importance 
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Searches and seizures of property are unconstitutional when law en-
forcement officials conduct them without a warrant or without probable 
cause in exigent circumstances.93 There are significant social and legal 
interests in preventing police officers from conducting unconstitutional 
searches and seizures. Prosecutors do not want evidence that could con-
vict a defendant when it results from an unconstitutional search that 
could subject the evidence to the exclusionary rule.94 And privacy inter-
ests for the general public outweigh any benefit that an unconstitutional 
search and seizure might allow.95 This is especially true because of the 
exclusionary rule. Thus, police officers who have a history of repeated 
unconstitutional searches of property should be held accountable by 
this system. 
Under the Fourth Amendment, citizens have the right to be free 
from a law enforcement officer’s use of excessive or deadly force without 
justification. As the Department of Justice investigations demonstrate, 
law enforcement officers violate this right in a widespread and rampant 
 
of Police Data, Sunlight Foundation (Mar. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2015/03/02/stop-and-frisk-in-4-cities-the-
importance-of-open-police-data-2/ [https://perma.cc/4NQ6-UXPL]. Many 
police departments—though some better than others—keep internal records 
of stop-and-frisks, including the names of those officers who employ the 
tactic. Id. The Sunlight Foundation is a non-profit entity dedicated to 
government accountability. About Us, Sunlight Foundation, https:// 
sunlightfoundation.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/2XN2-VCFU] (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2017). 
93. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that “[a]bsent 
exigent circumstances, [the entrance of a household] may not reasonably be 
crossed without a warrant.”). 
94. The exclusionary rule is a court-created remedy, couched in the Fourth 
Amendment, that grants protection to property owners who are subject to 
unconstitutional searches. Evidence obtained during an unconstitutional 
search can be suppressed later, thus significantly damaging a prosecutor’s 
ability to try a case. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 
(1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule, but applying it only to the federal 
government); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–60 (1961) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule is incorporated against the states). Since then, the Supreme 
Court has carved out many exceptions to the exclusionary rule, and now, 
the exclusionary rule acts as a balancing test. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. 
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998) (“[B]ecause the [exclusionary] rule is 
prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be 
applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social 
costs.’”) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)); see also 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006); Utah v. Strieff, 1036 S. Ct. 
2056, 2061 (2016). 
95. See William C. Heffernan, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a 
Constitutional Remedy, 88 Geo. L. J. 799, 832–40 (2000) (discussing privacy 
interests in the context of Weeks and beyond). 
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manner.96 The victims are often people of color, occasionally those with 
mental illness, and these violations are a contributing cause to the frac-
turing of police-community relations.97 Unfortunately, police depart-
ments and state governments do little to prevent these constitutional 
violations. Often, civilian complaints are ignored or filed incorrectly.98 
And even when an investigation moves forward against an officer, the 
protections that the officer gets through his or her union or through the 
“Blue Wall of Silence” mean that the officer rarely is disciplined.99 The 
ideal minimum standards for this system would include some method 
of penalizing an officer’s career when that officer engages in repeated 
instances of use of excessive or deadly force without justification. 
D. Racial Profiling and Bias 
Racial profiling and bias should be included as a minimum standard 
for decertification or revocation. The difficulty in using racial profiling, 
however, is determining whether an officer actually uses racial profiling 
and bias when carrying out his or her duties. While the investigation 
in Ferguson revealed that officers had exchanged racially charged mes-
sages with each other,100 not every case is so blatant. Unless an officer 
uses explicitly racial motives for effecting a stop or arrest, racial bias 
and profiling might only surface after extensive discovery of internal 
documents and policies. And as I will discuss later, the Supreme Court 
often sanctions police policies that have a disparate impact on people 
of color. While the ideal minimum standards would include some man-
ner of decertification for racial profiling and bias, it is only included 
here as a potential future instrument for determining unfitness for duty. 
Racial profiling, implicit and explicit bias, and selective enforce-
ment of laws are damaging policies that sour police-community rela-
tions. These policies affect all people of color; many surveys have found 
that a majority of people of color disagree with the notion that they are 
 
96. See, e.g., Baltimore Report, supra note 87, at 74–115 (examining the 
Baltimore City Police Department’s use of force tactics and policies); 
Chicago Report, supra note 90, at 22–46 (examining the same with the 
Chicago Police Department); Ferguson Report, supra note 90, at 28–41 
(examining the same with the Ferguson Police Department). 
97. Baltimore Report, supra note 87, at 47, 80; Ferguson Report, supra 
note 90, at 28.  
98. See, e.g., Baltimore Report, supra note 87, at 139–48 (discussing the 
Baltimore police department’s obstruction of investigations and lack of 
oversight); Chicago Report, supra note 90, at 50–62 (discussing the 
Chicago police department’s obstruction of investigations into police 
misconduct); Ferguson Report, supra note 90, at 82–86 (discussing the 
Ferguson police department’s inadequate complaints process). 
99. See generally infra Section II.B. 
100. Ferguson Report, supra note 90, at 72. 
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treated as fairly as white citizens.101 African Americans and Latin Amer-
icans make up a disproportionate share of stops by law enforcement 
officers, such that the terms “driving-while-Black or -Brown” and 
“walking-while-Black or -Brown” have become ubiquitous as criticisms 
for police policies.102 In fact, studies have shown that African Americans, 
Latin Americans, and Asian Americans are stopped as much as “eight 
to ten times as often” as are white Americans.103 
The high number of stops is not indicative of a higher level of crime, 
though. Data from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration shows that white Americans use drugs such as crack 
and powder cocaine at similar rates, and other drugs such as halluci-
nogens, heroin, and stimulants at higher rates than African Ameri-
cans.104 From the early 1990s through 2007, the proportion of African 
Americans arrested for drugs has never dropped below three times the 
proportion of white Americans arrested for drugs.105 And the years 
between 1988 and 1993 saw rates of drug arrests for African Americans 
more than five times that of drug arrests for white Americans.106 Race, 
then, seems to be the factor that explains this discrepancy the most. 
The judicial system complicates this matter. The Supreme Court 
often strengthens privacy and personal protections for white citizens, 
while weakening them for citizens of color. Illinois v. Wardlow,107 de-
cided in 2000, allows officers to label drug-dealing areas, which 
predominantly appear in inner-city African American areas, as high-
crime areas for purposes of stopping a citizen.108 Whren v. United 
 
101. See Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in 
the Selective Enforcement of Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 721, 722 nn. 1–2 (2004) (discussing multiple surveys 
conducted on the topic of selective enforcement of laws). 
102. Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o 
Cooperation in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 Fla. 
L. Rev. 341, 343–44 (2003). 
103. Id. at 344. 
104. See List of Available Quick Tables for the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health, 2011, Nat’l Addiction & HIV Data Archive Program, 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/quicktables/quickconfig.do?34481-0001_all 
[https://perma.cc/QBQ2-SQ3R] (last visited Jan. 22, 2018).  
105. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 257, 271–72 (2009). 
106. See id. at 272 for a chart depicting drug arrests using data from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. 
107. 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
108. Id. at 124; see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the 
Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-Crime Areas,” 63 Hastings L. J. 
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States,109 decided in 1996, allows officers to justify traffic stops for minor 
infractions, even if the stop is pretextual and based on race.110 The cur-
tilage doctrine, which protects the area immediately surrounding a 
home,111 does not protect the hallway of an apartment.112 The doctrine 
means that courts often protect affluent communities, where houses are 
the typical dwellings, but do little to protect inner-city areas, low-in-
come areas, and areas populated by people of color, where apartments 
are the more common dwellings.113 
The difficulty in effectively tracking police officers in regard to ra-
cial profiling and bias comes from the lack of internal enforcement and 
investigation of these complaints. It is further complicated by judicial 
protections for officers, such as those seen in Wardlow and Whren. The 
ideal legislation would ensure reporting of police officers who employ 
racial profiling and biased tactics when making stops and arrests. 
Despite judicial protection, many of these policies still create unfair bur-
dens on communities of color and harm police-community relations. 
This system should at least work to eradicate those instances of racial 
profiling that are explicitly unconstitutional. While a more robust sys-
tem may require a changing of jurisprudence to eliminate a majority of 
racial profiling, this is ultimately beyond the scope of this Note. 
II. The Challenges of Preventing Hiring Officers with 
Poor History 
The status quo, which does little to prevent police departments 
from hiring demonstrably unqualified officers such as Timothy 
Loehmann, Sean Sullivan, or Eddie Boyd III, must be changed. That 
much is clear. Public support for police officers and the idea that police 
control and accountability in any form is anti-police make it difficult to 
broach these subjects without eliciting significant criticism. But police 
officers should be as qualified as current statutes and jurisprudence al-
low to serve and protect communities. Valiant efforts, such as the House 
and Senate bills from the 1990s, have been attempted, but few have 
brought about any significant change because of these steep barriers. 
 
179, 217 (discussing the correlation between high crime areas and 
communities of color). 
109. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
110. Id. at 812–13. 
111. Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
112. Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage 
Doctrine to Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 Geo. Mason C. R. L.J. 297, 
310 (2005). 
113. Id. at 310–12. 
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Some barriers fall under general issues in employment law, such as 
confidentiality agreements signed in the wake of termination or resig-
nation and police unions, which often provide substantial support for 
bad police officers. Further, despite a majority of states having some 
form of decertification for officers, the decertification is not uniform and 
might not capture all of what this Note defines as police misconduct. 
Other barriers take the form of widespread cultural issues in police de-
partments and the infamous “Blue Wall of Silence.” Still further bar-
riers to systemic national change arise due to the issues inherent in fed-
eralism and the decentralization of police departments. Each of these 
delicate issues must be dealt with in order to enact programs that would 
give police departments the tools necessary to hire the best applicants. 
A. Confidentiality Agreements 
Confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements, either signed during 
termination or resignation proceedings or enacted by state and local 
law, provide ample protection for police officers. In many states, police 
officers enjoy broad protections for their personnel files, and both 
legislatures and the judicial system have broadened the definition of 
personnel files to include disciplinary matters. Any serious program de-
signed to prevent the hiring of previously-disciplined officers or officers 
who have committed crimes or constitutional violations needs to be able 
to breach these confidential personnel files. 
In California, for example, the penal code gives broad confi-
dentiality protections to police officers personnel files.114 Personnel files 
consist of employment history, records of investigation or complaints 
regarding the officer that stem from the officer’s official duties, and 
departmental discipline.115 The only way to acquire the personnel record 
of a police officer in California is during litigation or if either the At-
torney General, or a district attorney, commence an investigation into 
the officer’s actions.116 Theoretically, each of these types of information 
could demonstrate an officer’s unfitness for duty. But with relatively 
little means for acquiring the police officer’s personnel record, a lone 
police department would be unable to determine whether it wished to 
hire the officer. 
Court decisions also affect whether personnel records are discov-
erable. In Montgomery County v. Shropshire,117 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland ruled that internal investigations of two officers were con-
 
114. Cal. Penal Code § 832.7 (2004). 
115. Id. § 832.8. 
116. Id. § 832.7. 
117. 23 A.3d 205 (Md. 2011). 
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sidered personnel records, rather than investigations.118 A complaint 
had been filed alleging that the officers had conducted themselves im-
properly during the investigation of a traffic accident.119 The internal 
investigation found that the officers had not committed any adminis-
trative violations.120 In response, the Montgomery County Inspector 
General requested the records of the officers and of the internal affairs 
investigation.121 Labeling the internal investigations as personnel rec-
ords exempted them from disclosure requirements under the Maryland 
Public Information Act.122 The court reasoned that there was a “signif-
icant public interest in preserving the confidentiality of internal police 
investigations both in promoting cooperation by civilian witnesses and 
police officers.”123 This created an even more stringent regime than that 
of California; in Maryland, the court said that internal investigations 
do not have to be disclosed to county Inspectors General. If the investi-
gating arm of the county government is unable to access records of in-
ternal investigations, then there is little hope of police departments 
acquiring them when screening applicants either. 
There is a distinction between what California law and Maryland 
courts say and the issue discussed here. The legislation proposed would 
condition the release of this information on self-reporting, rather than 
any investigatory powers. The California statute and, more narrowly, 
Shropshire stand for preventing the release of this internal information 
to the public. The Department of Justice would be the only entity able 
to see all of the information contained in the database created by this 
legislation. Police departments would only have access insofar as they 
would be conducting background investigations on specific officers. The 
police departments would not have carte blanche to view all informa-
tion in the database and thus the database should be outside any con-
cerns raised in the California statute and in Shropshire. 
B. Police Unions, Police Culture, and the “Blue Wall of Silence” 
Police unions are politically powerful and highly influential in com-
munities around the country. They work hard to protect officers who 
engage in police misconduct. Police unions often hold such enormous 
sway because of the importance of police to the community. Police un-
ions, though, have gone far beyond the simple collective bargaining and 
employment protections offered by other unions. Instead, police unions 
 
118. Id. at 218. 
119. Id. at 207. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 208. 
122. Id. at 207. 
123. Id. at 216. 
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have used their power to influence state and local politicians to enact 
laws that help to cover up evidence of police misconduct. 
In early 2016, The Guardian combed extensively through hacked 
files belonging to the Fraternal Order of Police, the nation’s largest po-
lice union.124 The nearly 2.5 gigabytes of leaked files contained agree-
ments between cities and local branches of the Fraternal Order of 
Police.125 The hacks showed that cities all across the United States were 
inserting provisions into the agreements that protected police officers 
who engaged in misconduct.126 In a large number of contracts, there 
were provisions that allowed for, or required, the destruction of “records 
of civilian complaints, departmental investigations, or disciplinary ac-
tions after a negotiated period of time.”127 In some instances, that period 
of time was as little as a few months.128 
The “Blue Wall of Silence” is heavily intertwined with police union 
policies. The police code of silence has been long observed in academia, 
news, and court opinions as a significant barrier to holding police offi-
cers accountable for their actions.129 Officers often face serious and 
brutal consequences from other officers if they break the code.130 In the 
past, cooperating officers have lost their careers, had their property de-
stroyed, and have feared for their lives.131 
There is further evidence that unions often explicitly condone the 
“Blue Wall of Silence” and implicitly condone the retaliation that coop-
erating officers receive. In the wake of the killing of Laquan McDonald 
in Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel formed a police accountability task 
force.132 The task force concluded that “the police unions and the City 
 
124. George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary 
Records Will Be Kept Secret, Guardian (Feb. 7, 2016, 7:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/07/leaked-police-files-
contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret [https://perma. 
cc/88HS-AA2D]. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. Protections include “slow[ing] down misconduct investigations, 
prevent[ing] public access to complaints and disciplinary records, and 
enabl[ing] the destruction of complaints and disciplinary records after a 
negotiated period of time. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Chin & Wells, supra note 73, at 238–40 nn.16–22. 
130. See id. at 256–61 (discussing officer retaliation in general and with specificity 
in the accompanying footnotes). 
131. Id. at 242–43 n.25. 
132. Clarence Page, Cleaning Up a Police Culture of Cover-up, Chi. Trib. (Apr. 
15, 2016, 12:21 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/page/ 
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have essentially turned the code of silence into official policy.”133 This 
is not limited to just Chicago. Jurisdictions around the country have 
made it easier for unions to protect officers behind the “Blue Wall of 
Silence.”134 Often, collective bargaining agreements have provisions that 
allow for a grace period—an “interrogation buffer”—before interviews 
take place, which ostensibly gives police departments the ability to co-
operate on responses to investigations.135 
Police department culture is also toxic, protecting officers from 
public scrutiny and liability. Mayor Emanuel created the above-men-
tioned Chicago police accountability taskforce after it came to light that 
the police department had worked to cover up any evidence of wrong-
doing on the part of Officer Jason Van Dyke.136 Officer Van Dyke told 
investigators that he feared for his life.137 Officers who witnessed Van 
Dyke shoot and kill McDonald told investigators, under oath, that Offi-
cer Van Dyke acted in self-defense when he shot Laquan McDonald, 
because McDonald “had moved menacingly toward [Van Dyke] with a 
knife.”138 Command-level officials in the police department also agreed 
that Officer Van Dyke acted reasonably.139 Contrary to the police de-
partment’s public statements, video evidence shows that Laquan 
 
ct-page-police-racism-laquan-emanuel-task-force-perspec-0417-jm-20160415-
story.html [https://perma.cc/TQT2-XCPX]. 
133. Police Accountability Task Force, Recommendations for 
Reform: Restoring Trust Between the Chicago Police and the 
Communities They Serve 14 (2016). 
134. See Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police 
Accountability? An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of 
Rights, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 185, 207–08 (2005) (discussing a typical 
provision in Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights that “enshrine[s] in law 
the previously illegal blue wall of silence . . . .”). 
135. Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: 
How to Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. Chi. 
Legal F. 213, 220 (2016). 
136. Page, supra note 132; see also Mitch Smith & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 7 
Chicago Officers Face Firing Over Laquan McDonald Cover-Up, N.Y. 
Times (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/laquan-
mcdonald-chicago-police.html [https://perma.cc/4VFB-F7FC]; Jeremy 
Gorner, et al., Top Police Brass Defended Laquan McDonald Shooting After 
Seeing Video, Records Show, Chi. Trib. (Dec. 23, 2016, 6:55 AM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquanmcdonald/ct-laquan-mcdonald-
shooting-inspector-general-report-met-20161222-story.html [https://perma. 
cc/K57R-JQMA]. 
137. Gorner, supra note 136.  
138. Smith & Oppel, supra note 136. 
139. Gorner, supra note 136. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4 
A Reform to Police Department Hiring 
1282 
McDonald was stumbling away from officers when Van Dyke fired his 
gun sixteen times, killing the Chicago youth.140 
While police unions have worked tirelessly to institute police-friend-
ly policies at the state and local level, they have worked just as tirelessly 
to prevent reforms that would have a positive effect on police-com-
munity relations. Many states have a system whereby officers who com-
mit misconduct can be decertified or have their licenses revoked.141 In 
those states that do not have a certification system, it is largely due to 
the efforts of police unions blocking accountability reforms.142 Other 
common-sense reforms that police unions have blocked include the use 
of body cameras, nametags, and more thorough reports and documen-
tation of racial profiling, bias, and excessive use of force.143 Further, po-
lice unions consistently oppose the oversight power of civilian review 
boards.144 
In most other jobs, background investigations would uncover in-
stances of law-breaking and misconduct allegations from supervisors 
and coworkers. But in the police department context, the “Blue Wall 
of Silence” effectively covers up evidence of misbehaving officers. These 
lax laws and policies concerning background investigation should not 
be applied to law enforcement officers sworn to protect and serve our 
communities. Thus, the legislation should enable the piercing of this 
thick veil of secrecy propagated by police unions and local governments. 
C. Certification and Licensure 
Many occupations—namely, doctors, airline pilots, and lawyers—
have licenses or certifications. In the event of misconduct or malprac-
tice, professionals in these occupations often face the risk of being de-
certified or stripped of their licenses. This is so the government or inde-
pendent boards in charge of regulating those professions uphold the in-
tegrity and ensure that honest, ethical, and competent people are 
 
140. Page, supra note 132. 
141. See infra Section II.C. 
142. Revocation, supra note 39, at 571. 
143. James Surowiecki, Why Are Police Unions Blocking Reform?, New Yorker 
(Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/09/19/why-
are-police-unions-blocking-reform [https://perma.cc/A2DM-25K3]. 
144. Id. In Cleveland, Steve Loomis, the president of the local police union, serves 
on the Cleveland Community Police Commission. Various organizations 
have called on Loomis to resign because of his impartiality and tendency to 
undermine the work of the Cleveland Community Police Commission in the 
media. Sam Allard, Loomis Will Not Resign from Community Police 
Commission, Cleveland Scene (Jan. 28, 2016, 4:54 PM), http:// 
www.clevescene.com/scene-and-heard/archives/2016/10/18/vocal-demands 
-call-for-removal-of-steve-loomis-from-cleveland-police-commission [https:// 
perma.cc/AT9L-5SXQ]. 
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employed in these fields. For law enforcement officers, a majority of 
states do offer certification or licensure. The problems lie in consistency, 
enforcement, the power of state decertification boards, and the lack of 
efficacy across state borders. 
1. Consistency 
Forty-three states have adopted some form of decertification as a 
penalty for committing various forms of misconduct or criminal activi-
ty.145 Each state maintains a similar construction for its decertification 
regime. Peace Officer Standards and Training Commissions are state-
created entities that are in charge of defining the criteria for serving as 
a law enforcement officer.146 Each state also provides for sanctions short 
of decertification.147 The similarities end there, however, as many states 
have different criteria for law enforcement officer certification. 
Of the states that do have a decertification process, there is little 
consistency in the reasons that will lead to decertification. The states 
can be categorized into two different tiers. In the first tier are the states 
that decertify officers for felony and, in some states, misdemeanor con-
victions.148 That is clearly a good first step; officers should not be al-
lowed to serve after felony convictions. But the states in the first tier 
stop at felony and misdemeanor convictions instead of also including 
administrative adjudications and misconduct.149 Further, decertification 
in those states that require a conviction provides a large amount of dis-
cretion to prosecutors, who may or may not pursue charges against an 
officer.150 
In the second tier are those states that further include adminis-
trative hearings and adjudications by administrative law judges as a 
basis for decertification.151 This is in addition to decertification as a 
result of criminal convictions.152 In this tier, there exists a broad spec-
trum of administrative charges and disciplinary infractions that lead to 
administrative decertification. In some states, decertification follows 
from general “conduct unbecoming a law enforcement officer” or “act[s] 
 
145. Revocation, supra note 39, at 542. 
146. Id. at 542–43. 
147. Id. at 544. 
148. Model Law, supra note 39, at 150–51. 
149. Id. at 151. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
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committed . . . under color of law that involve[] moral turpitude.”153 In 
others, decertification follows from more specific infractions, such as 
excessive use of force or perjury.154 
Intertwined in both of the tiers are those states that pursue decerti-
fication as a result of officer termination for good cause or resignation 
in lieu of termination for good cause.155 This can provide ample protec-
tion against hiring unfit officers by catching those who have a pattern 
or history of misconduct that does not rise to the level of administrative 
adjudications. The weakness in this policy, though, is when an officer 
is decertified for a good-cause termination resulting from inability to 
get along with other officers.156 In other words, an officer who is pre-
textually fired, possibly for breaching the “Blue Wall of Silence,” can 
be subject to decertification for acting contrary to the union or his or 
her commanding officer. 
Resignation is also viewed differently by states that have decertifi-
cation boards. In those states that have termination for good cause as 
a basis for decertification, some also include provisions allowing for de-
certification if an officer resigns in the face of imminent investigation 
into conduct that could lead to termination for good cause.157 In Wash-
ington, a proposed law would have allowed the state Peace Officers 
Standards and Training Commission to decertify officers who resigned 
when conduct could have led to termination, whether the conduct had 
been discovered by supervisors or not.158 It is especially important to 
include resignation in the face of imminent investigation or discipline 
because police departments oftentimes sign confidentiality agreements 
so that they do not have to engage in lengthy and expensive hearings 
and investigations.159 This lack of consistency between the states neces-
sitates finding a common, minimum standard for officer revocation. 
2. Power of State Boards 
The states that do have state organizations for decertification of of-
ficers also differ in the boards’ power to act unilaterally. In some states, 
the state board can act absent local departmental action to revoke or 
 
153. Id. For examples of states that have this statutory language, see id. at 151 
nn.12 & 14. 
154. Id. at 152. 
155. Id. 
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157. Revocation, supra note 39, at 560. 
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decertify an officer for misconduct.160 In some states, the board must 
wait for the local department to terminate or begin termination pro-
ceedings before the board can revoke or decertify an officer.161 In a pro-
posed statute, a separate state civil service board has the power to ov-
erturn a local department’s decision.162 Thus, even if a police chief or 
sheriff would like to terminate an officer for good cause, the civil service 
board can have a hearing, and the officer, represented by union counsel, 
can be reinstated to his or her position. In those states, the state decerti-
fication board cannot take any action, even if the officer was justifiably 
terminated in the first place.163 This can have the effect of a police chief 
deciding not to terminate an officer or even start disciplinary pro-
ceedings. The chief, hoping to save money, would rather allow the offi-
cer to resign, than spend the time and resources investigating, holding 
hearings, and litigating before the state board only to have to rehire 
the officer and give him or her back pay.164 Thus, while this system 
should include protections for officers in the event of unjust termina-
tion, it should also make sure that the reasonable and correct final 
decisions of police departments are upheld. 
3. Enforcement 
Issues also arise in enforcement of decertification. Even when a state 
has provisions in place to decertify law enforcement officers who commit 
misconduct, officers may not be decertified for their misconduct. In 
Carney v. White,165 an officer had been fired from a Wisconsin police 
department for trading, and offering to trade, leniency in traffic tickets 
for sexual favors.166 After the first police department fired him, he ac-
 
160. Id. at 558. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 558–59. 
163. Id. Civil service boards are often criticized as pro-police and pro-union. One 
example of an officer reinstated after justifiable termination occurred in 
Braintree, Massachusetts. Officer James Kelleher was fired from his position 
as a police officer after he and his girlfriend assaulted his then-wife. After the 
police department went through the lengthy process of terminating him, the 
civil service commission overturned that decision and reinstated him with 
back pay. See David Armstrong, Second Chance for Bad Cops: Chiefs Say 
Civil Service Thwarts Discipline, Bos. Globe (May 21, 2000), http:// 
cache.boston.com/globe/metro/packages/civil_service/part1.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/FT7K-KCBK] (discussing James Kelleher and the problem with 
the civil service commissions in Massachusetts). 
164. Revocation, supra note 39, at 599. 
165. 843 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Wis. 1992). 
166. Id. at 478. 
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quired employment with another Wisconsin police department.167 The 
second police department later fired him, and his victims sued the city 
when he committed the same form of misconduct.168 While misconduct 
did lead to decertification in this instance, the state board was not re-
quired to decertify in the case of termination; instead, the state board 
allowed local police departments discretion in deciding whether to con-
duct background investigations or whether to hire an officer.169 
Similarly, in Doe v. Wright,170 a police officer resigned after at-
tempting to exchange leniency in traffic citations for sexual favors.171 
His original police department followed statutory requirements when it 
reported his resignation to the state board.172 But because Arkansas law 
at the time did not require police departments to include information 
as to why the officer resigned, he was not decertified.173 When he subse-
quently secured employment at a new police department, he was caught 
engaging in the same misconduct and fired.174 Arkansas later amended 
its laws to require the disclosure of information as to why an officer 
resigned.175 
The cases of White and Wright are not anomalous. Rather, they are 
compounded by the fact that, as discussed previously, prosecutors have 
substantial discretion in determining whether to pursue charges against 
a police officer. In that sense, a decertification program that relies solely 
on convictions would let officers who engage in other forms of miscon-
duct, or in criminal activity that a prosecutor does not pursue, slip 
through the cracks. As discussed above, police unions and the “Blue 
Wall of Silence” provide ample protections for officers accused of mis-
conduct. This often leads to situations like that of Officer Van Dyke, 
where nearly a year passed before the prosecutor formally charged him 
with a crime.176 In that time, he had not been under any significant in-
vestigation by the Chicago Police Department which would have risen 
to the level of decertification.177 An officer in Van Dyke’s position, then, 
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169. Revocation, supra note 39, at 561. 
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177. In Illinois, the board may not certify any officer who has been convicted of 
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could have resigned and taken a position as a police officer in another 
jurisdiction. 
4. Lack of Efficacy Across Borders 
Finally, state governments control certifications of law enforcement 
officers within their borders. Each state controls the requirements for 
officer certification and controls the bases for decertification. This has 
the effect of creating vastly different systems from one state to the next. 
Decertifying conduct in one state may not rise to the level of decer-
tification in another state. Thus, an officer like Sean Sullivan, who is 
fired and who would lose his certification in most states, is able to cross 
state borders to work as a police chief. While the cases of Wright and 
White above illustrate this situation in the context of intrastate police 
departments, police departments that wish to hire applicants who pre-
viously worked out of state have little means to discover previous mis-
conduct. 
The case that led James T. Moore, Commissioner of the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement, to testify in support of the Law 
Enforcement and Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act 
of 1996 involved an officer doing exactly this. In West Palm Beach 
County, Florida, two police officers engaged in the use of deadly force, 
killing Robert Jewett.178 One of the officers came from Tennessee after 
resigning from a police department for former misconduct.179 In the in-
vestigation into Jewett’s death, it came to light that the officer from 
Tennessee had explicitly asked the Chattanooga police department not 
to report that he was forced to resign.180 Under Tennessee law at the 
time, a suspension or termination was enough for the state board to de-
certify an officer.181 But because he resigned and pledged to move to 
Florida to continue his law enforcement career, his new police depart-
ment was unaware of his past misconduct.182 In his testimony, Commis-
sioner Moore said of Jewett’s death: “I am confident that had [his] 
record[] been known when [he] applied for [his] police job[], [he] would 
have never been hired. Had this happened, Mr. Jewett might be alive 
 
not indicted until over a year after the shooting. Steve Schmadeke, Chicago 
Cop Indicted on 6 Murder Counts in Laquan McDonald Slaying, Chi. Trib. 
(Dec. 16, 2015, 8:32 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ 
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today.”183 A system that works both interstate and intrastate is desper-
ately needed to prevent tragic events like the killing of Robert Jewett. 
D. Federalism and the Decentralization of Police Departments 
The federal government does not have general police powers. Many 
Supreme Court cases speak to the exclusive power of state governments 
to regulate police departments.184 Police power is almost exclusively in 
the hands of state governments under the Tenth Amendment. Some 
states take this a step further; they have decentralized their police func-
tions to the point that local police departments often set their own in-
ternal hiring and qualification policies.185 This presents genuine chal-
lenges with regard to implementing effective policies to prevent the 
hiring of problem officers. 
But police power and criminal activity, as well as police account-
ability, have been increasingly subject to dual enforcement from the 
federal government. And in the past, the Supreme Court has indicated 
a willingness to uphold federal police accountability laws if enacted 
through the proper channels.186 Federal courts oversee and ensure en-
forcement with the federal government reforms when the Department 
of Justice negotiates consent decrees with local police departments 
found to be engaging in unconstitutional practices under 34 U.S.C. § 
12601.187 Other federal crime bills, including the Omnibus Crime 
 
183. Police Officers’ Rights and Benefits, supra note 29, at 175 (prepared 
statement of James T. Moore, Comm’r, Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement). 
184. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (“The 
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is truly local . . . Indeed, [there is] no better example of the police power, 
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States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that the states 
“historically have been sovereign” in the field of law enforcement). 
185. As discussed above, see supra Section II.C.3., some states have similar 
systems to Wisconsin. In Wisconsin, despite having a Peace Officer 
Standards and Training Commission, the law allows for local police 
departments to decide whether to hire an officer or whether to conduct a 
background investigation. Such decentralization causes issues such as those 
seen in Carney v. White. See supra notes 165–168 and accompanying text; 
Revocation, supra note 39, at 561. 
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remedy included in the Violence Against Women Act, but indicated a 
willingness to uphold the rest of the act. 529 U.S. at 627. And, in United 
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categories. 514 U.S. at 558. 
187. See supra Section I.C. 
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Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,188 the Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994,189 and the Gun-Free Schools Act of 
1994,190 are still good law despite states being the main arbiters of police 
power and criminal laws. 
E. Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights 
Many of the policies supported by local police unions and promul-
gated by local governments can be traced to a single, highly effective 
barrier to police accountability. Fourteen states currently have enacted 
a Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBoR”) to protect the 
due process of officers during internal investigations.191 Still more states 
and localities have adopted, as part of collective bargaining agreements, 
similar protections afforded by the LEOBoRs in those fourteen states.192 
Protections include longer waiting periods for the commencement of an 
investigation, interviews conducted only by fellow law enforcement offi-
cers, and notice of investigation provided to both the law enforcement 
officer and his or her union representative.193 In all cases, officers are af-
forded more rights than the suspects that they interrogate and investi-
gate on a daily basis.194 These provisions directly shield officers from ac-
countability by providing them with substantial leniency during in-
vestigations. While LEOBoRs generally only apply in those instances 
where an officer is under internal investigation, in most cases an inter-
nal investigation is the only one an officer will face for alleged 
misconduct.195 While not necessarily a direct impediment to decertifica-
tion—LEOBoRs do not include provisions denying states the ability to 
decertify officers—the LEOBoRs are impediments to the investigatory 
 
188. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (current version at 34 U.S.C. § 10101 et 
seq. (2017)). 
189. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 
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190. 20 U.S.C. § 7961 (2015). 
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Rights?, Marshall Project (Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.themarshall 
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Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode 
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192. Keenan & Walker, supra note 134, at 185–86. 
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194. Other provisions not afforded to suspects include limits on duration of 
interviews, protections against harassing or threatening during interrogation, 
and limits on the number of interrogators present during an interview. Id. 
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powers of police departments. Thus, police departments are more likely 
to allow the officer to resign than to spend the time and resources that 
comes with these investigations. And this can have the effect of shield-
ing the officer from decertification. 
F. The Inadequacy of Alternative Remedies 
There are several remedies currently available for deterring police 
officers from committing misconduct. These other remedies, however, 
are entirely inadequate at dealing with problem officers acquiring new 
positions. The exclusionary rule is now subject to a balancing test, 
meaning that even if officers do commit unconstitutional searches and 
seizures, the evidence may still be admitted at trial.196 Consent decrees 
established under 34 U.S.C. § 12601 have had modest successes in 
changing institutional policies, but do not deter individual officers from 
unconstitutional conduct.197 Section 1983 actions may provide some de-
terrence, but jury bias in favor of the officers and the Supreme Court’s 
expansion of qualified immunity has made it increasingly difficult to 
hold officers accountable.198 Criminal prosecutions of law enforcement 
officers also do not provide much deterrence. Prosecutors, who can only 
effectively carry out their duties with the help of police officers, are 
reluctant to bring criminal charges.199 And, as in 1983 actions, jury bias 
favors officers, making it very difficult to prosecute officers success-
fully.200 Internal investigations also rarely hold officers accountable for 
their actions.201 Thus, a new remedy is required that will effectively de-
ter officers from committing crimes and misconduct. 
III. A Cooperative Federalism Solution 
Cooperative federalism is a regulatory regime in which the federal 
government enacts a law, and then “invite[s] state agencies to super-
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197. See Adeshina Emmanuel, How Union Contracts Shield Police Departments 
from DOJ Reforms, In These Times (June 21, 2016), http:// 
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intend [the] federal law.”202 It is commonly characterized as the federal 
government enacting federal minimum standards, which are then imple-
mented by state agencies.203 Generally, the law allows for wide discre-
tion; states can enact the minimum standards, can create more strin-
gent standards, or, in some cases, can receive federal exemption from 
the minimum standards.204 Cooperative federalism allows states to tailor 
the minimum standards to local conditions within the state.205 Cooper-
ative federalism reflects the federal government’s understanding that 
not all states are the same, and thus it allows each state latitude to de-
termine which policy works best for that state. 
One of the most well-known cooperative federalism regimes is the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) enforcement of air quality 
standards under the Clean Air Act. Passed using the Commerce Clause, 
the Clean Air Act requires the EPA to promulgate minimum standards 
for ambient air quality of different environmental air pollutants.206 Once 
those standards are created, the states must submit for EPA approval 
implementation plans that meet, but may exceed, the minimum stand-
ards.207 A state may opt out and allow the EPA to create and implement 
a federal plan for the state.208 If a state fails to submit a plan for 
approval, or if a state fails to come into compliance with its EPA-ap-
proved plan, then the EPA can sanction the state in a number of 
ways.209 The EPA can also sanction certain parts of states, rather than 
the entire state, if the parts are designated as “non-attainment areas.”210 
Thus, the Clean Air Act implements many of the hallmarks of a cooper-
ative federalism regime: the federal government promulgates minimum 
standards; the state chooses to adopt or modify the minimum standards 
subject to approval by the federal government; and, the federal govern-
ment does not coerce, but merely persuades states to adopt and enforce 
the regime. 
Clearly, the problem of police departments hiring officers who have 
committed crimes, have been fired for misconduct, or have resigned in 
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the face of imminent discipline has little to do with the environment. 
But the structure of the cooperative federalism regime implemented un-
der the Clean Air Act provides a blueprint for implementing necessary 
reforms in police department hiring processes. One could envision a law, 
passed using Congressional Spending Power rather than the Commerce 
Clause, in which Congress gives power to the Department of Justice to 
promulgate minimum standards for law enforcement officer certification 
and decertification. The Department of Justice would also be respon-
sible for creating a database—and persuading the state and local police 
departments to self-report—that tracks only those officers who have 
been decertified. The Department of Justice could then implement these 
standards in a manner similar to how the EPA implements the Clean 
Air Act. Under the legislation, states would be required to submit plans 
to the Department of Justice for approval. Once approved, the Depart-
ment of Justice would give states a certain period of time to implement 
and begin enforcing the plans. If certain states or areas decline to im-
plement the minimum standards, the Department of Justice would have 
the power to implement a federal plan. If certain states or areas refuse 
or shirk their responsibilities under the Department of Justice approved 
plans, then the Department of Justice would be authorized to sanction 
the states. 
In constructing a cooperative federalism regime, the Department of 
Justice should enact fairly strict minimum standards for certification 
and decertification. The Department of Justice would also be tasked 
with creating a database to track officers who have been decertified 
pursuant to the minimum standards. It should allow a state, through 
its agencies, to implement the standards in a way that most benefits 
the state. The legislation would also include incentives and sanctions 
that would persuade state governments to comply with the law. 
Congress would give protections to officers so that it might be more 
palatable to officer unions and would assuage due process concerns. The 
legislation would also need to include a description of the relevant con-
stitutional powers that Congress relies on to implement the law. Part 
III of this Note aims to create legislation and minimum standards that 
would satisfy all of these requirements. 
A. Constitutional Powers and Challenges 
Under the Clean Air Act, Congress presented its findings in a way 
that spoke to the Clean Air Act’s constitutionality under the Commerce 
Clause. Pollution, Congress said, contributes to problems with 
transportation, crops, public health, and welfare. This has allowed the 
EPA’s enforcement regime under the Clean Air Act to survive 
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constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce Clause in federal court.211 
Additionally, the Clean Air Act has survived a non-delegation doctrine 
challenge212 and a Tenth Amendment challenge.213 Here, Congress could 
enact this legislation pursuant to the Spending Power. The main chal-
lenges to the legislation would come in the forms of overreach under 
the Spending Power, the non-delegation doctrine, and the anti-com-
mandeering doctrine. 
1. The Spending Power 
Congressional spending power is based in the first clause of Article 
I, Section 8 of the Constitution. This clause gives Congress the “Power 
To lay and collect Taxes . . . and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States.”214 In South Dakota v. Dole,215 the 
Supreme Court said that, implicit in the reading of this clause, is the 
power to “attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”216 The 
Court went on to place explicit limits on the spending power: (1) “the 
exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general wel-
fare”; (2) the condition must be unambiguous, “enabl[ing] the States to 
exercise their choice knowingly”; (3) the condition must be related “to 
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs”; and, 
(4) the condition must be otherwise constitutional.217 The Court stated 
that the condition must not be unduly coercive.218 Additionally, in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,219 the Court 
reaffirmed the necessity of Congress to make clear the conditions on 
funding and held that the conditions must affect future funding.220 In 
other words, Congress cannot use the spending power to take away 
funding that a state was given previously.221 
 
211. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282 
(1981).  
212. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
213. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310, 1314–15 (1977). 
214. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
215. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
216. Id. at 206. 
217. Id. at 207–08 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
218. Id. at 211. 
219. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
220. Id. at 2606–07 (“What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that 
choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing 
Medicaid funding.”) 
221. Id. 
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Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is authorized to order other 
agencies to withhold certain funding if an area is designated a non-at-
tainment area.222 This funding is limited to nonessential funding only; 
if the funding is needed for safety, public transit, or other explicitly 
listed reasons, the Department of Transportation must (for safety) or 
may (for the other reasons) approve grants or projects.223 Every year, 
Congress appropriates substantial amounts of grant funds for state and 
local police departments. Under this legislation, Congress would be able 
to authorize the Department of Justice to withhold certain amounts of 
grant funding through its Office of Justice Programs.224 Like the Clean 
Air Act, essential funding would not be withheld.225 
Grant funding for state and local law enforcement reached over $2.5 
billion during fiscal year 2016.226 One source of “funding” that the De-
partment of Justice could order to be withheld is the distribution of 
arms and other technology that the Department of Defense is author-
ized to give to state and local police departments under the 1033 Pro-
gram, which has distributed military equipment to 8,000 police depart-
ments in all fifty states as well as Washington, D.C., Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and the Virgin Islands since its inception in 1997.227 Another could 
be grants through the Community Oriented Policing Services 
(“COPS”) Program, which aims to advance community policing in local 
 
222. See supra Part III. 
223. 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b). 
224. For a list of funding and grant projects for fiscal years 2015, 2016, and 
2017, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FY 2017 DOJ Program Plan, 
https://www.grantsnet.justice.gov/programplan/html/Solicitations.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4VUH-A5BS] (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). 
225. While essential funding is not easily defined in this context, it could look 
similar to the Clean Air Act, where funding is not withheld for explicitly 
listed reasons, such as safety and public transportation. Here, essential 
funding could, likewise, be safety spending that reaches a certain level 
defined by the courts or Congress. One could imagine a scenario where 
funding for armored vehicles could be withheld while funding for bullet proof 
vests might be exempt from conditions. 
226. Police Grants: What’s Being Federally Funded in 2016, PoliceOne.com 
(Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.policeone.com/police-grants/articles/71130006-
police-grants-whats-being-federally-funded-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/GD5 
H-935P]. 
227. Excess Federal Property, Just. Tech. Info. Ctr., https://justnet.org/ 
resources/Excess-Federal-Property.html [https://perma.cc/PGU9-MP8A] 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2017); Law Enforcement Support Office, DEF. 
LOGISTICS AGENCY http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/Offers/Reutil 
ization/LawEnforcement.aspx [https://perma.cc/7GQX-FAH6] (last visited 
Mar. 21, 2017). 
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and state law enforcement.228 The COPS Program has given state and 
local police departments more than $14 billion since the program was 
created in 1994, and each department that wishes to receive funding 
must apply for the grant.229 Further, the Office of Justice Programs and 
various other federal offices and departments provide more grant fund-
ing to state and local law enforcement. 
As the federal government gives many state and local police depart-
ments grants and funding which are appropriated year after year—and 
applied for by those departments each year—conditioning the grants 
on the implementation of these standards would not run afoul of South 
Dakota v. Dole or NFIB v. Sebelius.230 The funding is tied to the general 
welfare; the COPS Program is designed to enhance community polic-
ing,231 the 1033 Program is designed to provide equipment officers in 
the field,232 and many of the other grants and funding are directly linked 
to general public safety measures.233 It would be simple enough to artic-
ulate explicitly what a state must do in order to comply with the legis-
lation, thus complying with the unambiguity requirement. Additionally, 
the funding is related “to the federal interest in particular national 
projects or programs”; Congress does have an interest in ensuring that 
the officers that are hired through the COPS Program and the officers 
that use the arms and technology through the 1033 Program act in a 
constitutional manner. Congress also has an interest in ensuring that 
the money that goes toward improving police-community relations is 
given to those departments that have hired offices which put the de-
partments in the best possible position to implement much needed re-
forms. Thus, this legislation would have a strong argument for consti-
tutionality under Congress’s Spending Power. 
 
228. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, About, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, https://cops.usdoj.gov/about [https://perma.cc/2JT4-VXSF] (last 
visited Mar. 21, 2017). 
229. Id. 
230. The type of grants and the exact amount conditioned on implementation of 
this system would need to be calculated to avoid the Supreme Court labeling 
the conditions “unduly coercive.” In South Dakota v. Dole, because South 
Dakota would only lose 5 percent of funding due to non-compliance, the 
Supreme Court found that the requirement was not coercive. 483 U.S. 203, 
211–12 (1987). Here, the calculation would involve more, as it would have 
to take into account direct funding of state and local police departments by 
the federal government, as well as funding given to the state governments 
earmarked for general law enforcement funding. 
231. About, supra note 228. 
232. Excess Federal Property, supra note 227. 
233. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 224. 
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2. Challenges 
Besides a challenge to this system under congressional spending 
power, the potential legislation could also face challenges under the non-
delegation and anti-commandeering doctrines. Under Article I, Section 
1 of the Constitution, “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States.”234 The Supreme Court has 
read this to mean that Congress may not delegate legislative duties to 
other branches of government.235 In J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United 
States,236 the Supreme Court held that Congress may delegate powers 
to the executive branch if Congress “shall lay down by legislative act 
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized . . . [act] 
is directed to conform.”237 
In Whitman v. American Trucking Association,238 the Supreme 
Court applied the intelligible principle requirements to the Clean Air 
Act. At issue in that case was whether the Clean Air Act was a con-
stitutional delegation of powers by Congress to the EPA.239 The Court 
held that, as long as the legislation contained an “intelligible principle” 
that directed the agency, it was not an unconstitutional delegation of 
power.240 In that case, the Clean Air Act included an intelligible princi-
ple because it requires the “EPA to set air quality standards at the 
‘requisite’ level, that is, not lower or higher than is necessary,” and does 
not need to specify exact levels.241 Here, the proposed legislation could 
include a provision that requires the Department of Justice to set mini-
mum qualifications for decertification that are not higher or lower than 
necessary to prevent police departments from hiring officers who have 
committed the police misconduct defined in Part I above. 
Another major challenge to this legislation could come in the form 
of an anti-commandeering challenge. Under the Tenth Amendment to 
the Constitution, Congress many not enact legislation that “comman-
deers” a state’s legislative or executive branch to carry out federal 
regulation.242 In New York v. United States, the seminal case on the 
 
234. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
235. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001). 
236. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
237. Id. at 409; Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472. 
238. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
239. Id. at 472–73. 
240. Id. at 473–76. 
241. Id. at 475–76. 
242. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (“As an initial matter, 
Congress may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the 
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
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anti-commandeering doctrine, the Supreme Court took issue with a 
federal law which compelled state governments to establish ownership 
of radioactive waste produced within that state’s borders. 243 In Printz 
v. United States,244 the Supreme Court ruled invalid a provision in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which required state law 
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on potential gun 
buyers because it compelled state officials to participate in a federal 
regulatory scheme.245 
In New York v. United States, however, the Court made clear that 
Congress still had the power to encourage state governments to enact 
federal regulatory programs.246 Congress, the Court said, has two means 
by which it can do so in a constitutional manner. First, Congress can 
use the spending power to persuade state governments to enact federal 
programs.247 Second, Congress can “offer States the choice of regulating 
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation.”248 As discussed in Part III.A.1, this leg-
islation could be tailored so as to be constitutional under the Spending 
Power. And the legislation would be constructed like the Clean Air Act, 
with federal enforcement in those areas where states cannot, or will not, 
enact the minimum standards. 
The intelligible principle seems to be a fairly lenient standard; in 
Whitman, the Court could only point to two cases in which the Court 
held invalid delegation legislation.249 While Justice Thomas has since 
criticized the leniency of the “intelligible principle” standard, it remains 
good law today.250 The legislation here simply needs to include the man-
ner in which the Department of Justice must act, set out in precise and 
unambiguous terms. In that way, the legislation would likely survive a 
challenge under the non-delegation doctrine. Further, because the leg-
islation will be designed to persuade, and not compel state and local 
 
program.’” (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 
452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))). 
243. See id. at 177–80 (discussing the unconstitutionality of the “take title” 
provision). 
244. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
245. Id. at 933–34. 
246. New York, 505 U.S. at 167–68 (discussing Congress’s power to encourage 
state governments to enact federal regulations). 
247. Id. at 167. 
248. Id. 
249. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (compiling cases in which the Supreme 
Court has undertaken an “intelligible principle” analysis). 
250. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1245–55 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
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law enforcement departments to participate, it will not run afoul of the 
anti-commandeering doctrine. 
B. The Legislation 
Like the Clean Air Act, this legislation must be thorough. In its 
nearly half century of existence, the Clean Air Act has been the subject 
of many constitutional challenges. Today, it still stands as a cooperative 
federalism regime that, not without criticism, has overseen many impor-
tant reforms to United States environmental policy. Like the EPA and 
the environment, the Department of Justice is an agency that is acutely 
aware of the challenges facing police departments. As such, the Depart-
ment of Justice is in the best position to create, and persuade compli-
ance with, minimum standards for police officer certification and decer-
tification. Fortunately, state mechanisms for enforcement are already 
in place; forty-three states have some form of Peace Officer Standards 
and Training Commission that could be the state liaison for the federal 
regulatory scheme.251 When creating the legislation, Congress would 
have to include provisions that give the Department of Justice power 
to promulgate and persuade compliance with the standards, to create 
and persuade compliance with the database, and to give the states the 
leniency needed to survive constitutional challenge. 
When Congress gave the EPA the power to promulgate minimum 
air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, it did so by including 
an “intelligible principle” to survive a non-delegation doctrine chal-
lenge. Congress instructed the EPA to promulgate these standards after 
a notice and comment period,252 subject to review by an independent 
scientific committee,253 and with the mandate that the standards must 
be related to protecting public health.254 In crafting the legislation which 
would authorize the Department of Justice to promulgate minimum 
standards and create the database, Congress would need to include an 
“intelligible principle.” Congress could do so by mandating that the 
Department of Justice hold a notice and comment period for the pro-
posed minimum standards. Congress could also require that the mini-
mum standards be subject to review by an independent committee con-
sisting of law enforcement professionals, academics, and other inde-
pendent, qualified citizens. And Congress would need to include a pro-
vision requiring the minimum standards to be directly related to pre-
venting police departments from hiring problem police officers. 
 
251. See supra Section II.C.1. 
252. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a). 
253. Id. § 7409(d). 
254. Id. § 7409(b). 
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As for the database, Congress could create the legislation in the 
mold of the proposed Law Enforcement and Correctional Officers Em-
ployment Registration Act of 1996. This time, however, Congress could 
respond to many of the criticisms that prevented the bill from making 
it out of committee.255 This version of the database should track only 
those officers who have been decertified pursuant to the minimum 
standards, rather than the employment history of all law enforcement 
officers in the United States.256 It should include confidentiality pro-
visions so that only the Department of Justice may access the database 
and so that police departments can only have access after securing a 
signed release of information from the police department applicant. As 
discussed above, the problem of officers moving to a different juris-
diction is not confined to anecdotal accounts anymore; rather, the prob-
lem has become well known in the media as a widespread issue.257 
Officers could be given notice of what information a police department 
is sending to the database, and Congress could include an appeal pro-
vision for officers to contest the publishing of employment history in 
the database. 
Like the sanctions that allow the EPA both to withhold transpor-
tation funding and to order other departments to withhold funding, this 
legislation could include sanctions, promulgated under the Spending 
Power, both for the adoption of the minimum standards and for report-
ing to the database. Congress could give the Department of Justice the 
authority to withhold certain funding and grants given to state and lo-
cal police departments as part of the Office of Justice Programs.258 This 
exercise of the Spending Power would be constitutional because: (1) it 
aims to improve public safety and confidence in police departments; (2) 
it would be enunciated in a clear and unambiguous manner, allowing 
states the opportunity to weigh the costs and benefits of the regulatory 
scheme; and (3) Congress has a particular interest in ensuring that its 
grant funding is used by police departments and officers who have a 
demonstrated ability to operate constitutionally. Further, the sanctions 
must not be coercive, and Congress is in the best position to determine 
whether the amount of funding that the Department of Justice can 
withhold would rise to that level. Finally, the sanctions and conditions 
would be forward looking because state and local police departments 
apply for the grants each year, rather than receiving them over time. 
 
255. See supra Introduction (discussing criticisms of the Law Enforcement and 
Correctional Officers Employment Registration Act of 1996). 
256. See infra Section III.C. 
257. See supra Introduction (discussing Timothy Loehmann, Sean Sullivan, Eddie 
Boyd III, Jason Van Dyke, Officer White, and Officer Wright); see also supra 
Section II.C.4. (discussing the killing of Robert Jewett). 
258. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 224. 
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Congress could include incentives as well, such as funding appro-
priated for the legislation that will assist states in adopting this cooper-
ative federalism regime. As for incentives for reporting to the database, 
Congress should include a qualified immunity defense against defama-
tion claims for police departments that, in good faith, report an officer’s 
employment changes to the state created agency. This qualified im-
munity should also extend to the state agencies that report the final 
determination of an officer’s status to the database.259 Finally, Congress 
should not force states to adopt this regulatory regime in order to com-
ply with the anti-commandeering doctrine. In those states and areas 
where police departments do not comply with the minimum standards 
or with the database, the Department of Justice should be authorized 
to implement a federal program. 
C. The Minimum Standards 
In the ideal system, the federal minimum standards would cover 
the requirements for both certification and decertification of police offi-
cers. The main focus of this Note, however, is attempting to prevent 
police departments from hiring problematic applicants who have al-
ready served as police officers. As such, the minimum standards this 
Note discusses will only cover the standards for decertifying an officer. 
In a program such as this, the federal minimum standards would have 
to be extensive, yet flexible, so that states can enact more stringent 
standards. The main focus of Department of Justice should be on 
creating the minimum standards by which police departments will know 
when they should not hire a police officer. 
To start, the Department of Justice should require the inclusion of 
police officers in the minimum standards and database. Police officers 
should include traditional state and local police, but also campus police 
officers, elected law enforcement officials such as sheriffs, and transit 
police.260 States should be free to include any other forms of law 
enforcement officers they desire, including correctional officers, investi-
gators for state bureaus of investigations, court appointed bailiffs, or 
state border protections officers.261 The standard for when a law en-
forcement officer should be decertified should, at a minimum, include 
when the officer commits felonies or certain misdemeanors, such as do-
mestic abuse or other violent misdemeanors, burglary, perjury, property 
theft, or unlawful possession of a weapon. It should also include firings 
with good cause or resignations in the face of imminent discipline or 
investigation, but only when resulting from misconduct as it relates to 
the public. Thus, an officer who is fired with good cause because of 
simple chemistry issues or who is pretextually fired for violating the 
 
259. See Model Law, supra note 39, at 154 (discussing qualified immunity). 
260. Id. at 150 (discussing law enforcement officers). 
261. Id. 
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“Blue Wall of Silence” should not be included in either the decer-
tification regime or database. Rather, the firing or resignation must 
come after instances of police brutality, perjury or corruption, or other 
unconstitutional activities as determined by adjudications or 
investigations carried out internally or by independent review boards. 
Conclusion 
Officers such as Timothy Loehmann, Sean Sullivan, and Eddie 
Boyd III should never have been in positions to commit the misconduct 
for which they have become known. Instead, these officers should have 
been subject to decertification because of their clear unfitness to work 
as law enforcement officers protecting and serving a community. Their 
former employers should have reported the reasons for their change in 
employment status to a state body. As a result, their new departments 
should have been able to see their employment history and should have 
been able to make the decision not to hire them. The system this Note 
describes does not purport to be exhaustive. Yet, such a system would 
provide a valuable starting point for enacting much needed reforms that 
will ensure that police departments and officers afford people equal 
protection of the law. 
Owen Doherty† 
 
†  J.D. 2018, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to 
thank my wonderful parents, Dennis and Carol, as well as my brothers, 
Patrick and Michael, who have always supported me in my endeavors.  
Without their love and encouragement, I would not be the man I am today. 
I would also like to thank Case Western Reserve University, the Law Review 
Journal, and Professor Jonathan Entin for giving me the opportunity to have 
my work published. 
